Abstract. This paper describes the dependability modelling and evaluation of a real complex system, made of redundant replicated hardware and redundant diverse software. It takes into account all aspects of their interactions (including correlation between the diverse software variants) and of the criticality of the several components. Our approach has been to realise the system model in a structured way. This allows to cope with complexity and to focus, where interesting, on specific behaviour for a more detailed analysis. Furthermore each level may be modelled using different methodologies and its evaluation performed with different tools without the need of modifying the general structure of the model. In order to validate the most complex sub-models, we built alternatives using different tools and methodologies; this proved to be very useful since it allowed to find small bugs and imperfections and to gain more confidence that the models represented the real system behaviour. With respect to the real system taken as the example, our analyses, which could not be reported here, allowed to establish the dependability bottlenecks of the current version and to state targets for the several subcomponents such that the system targets could be reached, thus providing hints for next releases or modifications of the system and information to assign targets to the various components of the system.
Introduction
Railway station interlocking systems based on microprocessors were developed in all technologically advanced countries and have been used since a few years by those Railway Authorities wishing to have a good cost/benefit ratio. In Europe and in Japan solid state interlocking systems were used in passenger transportation networks with medium/large stations and heavy-medium range traffic; in these applications complex interlocking systems were designed, including central and remote peripheral units, with vital data transmission between them [15] , [7] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [22] , while in the US small systems have been produced since the 80's, usually applied to freight transportation lines [3] , [10] . The use of computer controlled interlocking systems, in the place of the usual electro-mechanical systems, introduces non trivial problems in their design and analysis. Most difficult are those parts of the systems delegated to the control of vital functions, where the interactions between the redundant hardware and the application software have a critical impact on system safety. These interactions have an impact on modelling complexity since they induce stochastic dependencies that must be taken into account in modelling the behaviour of components and their interactions. In the literature several papers exist in the field of dependability analysis [1] , [20] , [5] , [4] , and some basilar papers exist on the approach to dependability evaluation of combined hardware and software systems [6] , [9] , [12] , [13] , [8] , but detailed modelling of the interactions between hardware and software components, in particular for critical systems, and the influence of the related dependencies has been treated, at our knowledge, only in [11] . The interest of such modelling lies in the support it may provide in the design phase of a complex system, when decisions have to be taken on possible different structures of the system for matching the dependability requirements imposed by the regulatory authorities. In the design phase it may be cost beneficial to construct different models for the different architectures and the several alternatives can be quantitatively evaluated; in this way sensitivity analysis is possible, to ascertain what are the most important parts of a design on which more resources have to be spent than on others and to identify, in a statistical manner, the dependability levels of the several hardware or software components and the trade-offs between them. This type of analysis, made for an already existing system, as it is the case in this paper, is important for an "a posteriori" dependability evaluation, for pointing out possible design weak points or bottlenecks, for the late validation of the dependability requirements (this can also be useful in certifying phase) and to provide sound hints for next releases or modifications of the systems.
The contribution of this paper is the modelling of a real complex systems, made of redundant replicated hardware and redundant diverse software taking into account all aspects of their interactions (including correlation between the diverse software variants) and of the criticality of the several components. Our approach has been to realise the system model in a structured way. This allows to cope with complexity and to focus, where interesting, on specific behaviour for a more detailed analysis. Structuring in different levels separated by well identified interfaces allows to realise each level with different methodologies and to perform its evaluation with different tools without the need of modifying the general structure of the model. Each level has been subdivided into several sub-levels for a finer analysis of some characteristics. The higher level of the hierarchy is made of the models for the evaluation of the dependability measures of interest (in our case, beside the availability, also reliability and safety measures have been assessed). These models use the values of success or failure probability obtained by the modelling of a mission, which describes the system behaviour on a period of time. The model of a mission uses, in its turn, the values obtained by several different models of a single execution and finally the model of one execution is subdivided into other levels which take into account the specific behaviour of the components of the system. With this structuring, each level is a sort of abstract object, whose implementation details are transparent to the adjacent levels, and therefore can be realised and analysed using the most proper tools and methodologies, which can differ from one level to another. Despite our effort for reducing the complexity of the individual levels with respect to the complexity of the entire system, some complex level remained and has been realised using different methodologies to compare and validate the used model. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains an overview of the Ansaldo TMR MODIAC system; Section 3 defines the meaning of the basic parameters used and describes our assumptions and the modelling approach. Sections 4 and 5 contain a description of the various models for one execution and for the mission respectively. As an example, a few evaluations of the dependability attributes are shown in Section 6 and finally Section 7 concludes this paper.
Ansaldo TMR MODIAC System.
We analysed the "Apparato Centrale con Calcolatore" (ACC) [15] system nucleus constructed by Ansaldo for their railway station signalling control system, called TMR MODIAC. The system is divided into two parts ( Figure 1 ):
• SN -->> is the subsystem which performs vital functions: it comprises the Safety Nucleus and a variable number, depending on the station size, of distributed Trackside Units, which communicate the state of the station to the central computer. After the necessary interactions with the operator, processing and controls, the central computer sends back commands for the signalling system to the Trackside Units.
• RDT -->> is a supervisory subsystem that performs Recording, Diagnosis and Telecontrol functions; this subsystem allows continuos monitoring of the system state and events recording; the latter is useful to make estimations and find out less reliable sections. The Safety Nucleus [14] is structured as shown in Figure 2 and is the vital part of the system. Unfortunately the Figure reports the components only, reporting all the data flows among them would have made very difficult to understand the drawing. The nucleus comprises six units with a separated power supply unit. The three Nsi sections represent three computers which are connected in TMR configuration, i.e. working with a "2-out-of-3" majority: three diverse software programs performing iteratively the same tasks, run inside three identical hardware sections. The system is designed to keep on running even after the failure of one section; in such a case the section is excluded and the system uses only two sections with a "2-out-of-2" majority, until the failed section is restored. A section excluded after failing is restored after a few minutes. The Exclusion Logic is a fail-safe circuit whose job is to electrically isolate the section that TMR indicated to be excluded. The activation/de-activation unit is a device that switches on and controls power supply units. The video switching unit controls video images to be transmitted to the monitors of the operator terminal.
The TMR sections carry out the same functions; the hardware, the basic software architecture and the operating environment are exactly the same; while "design diversity" [2] was adopted in the development of software application modules. The following measures were employed to enforce diversity: a) three teams of programmers, b) different programming languages, c) different coding of data and d) different memory locations for data and code. Each section is composed by two physically separated units which carry out different functions in parallel:
• GIOUL (operator interface manager and logical unit): executes the actual processing and manages the interactions with the Operator Terminal and the RDT subsystem;
• GP (trackside manager): manages the communications with the Trackside Units and modifies, whenever necessary, the commands given by GIOUL. The processing loops last 1 second for GIOUL and 250 msec for GP: this causes the communications between GIOUL and GP belonging to the same TMR section to be performed at every second (GIOUL loop), i.e. once every four loops of GP. Instead the communications between units of the same type (between the three GIOUL units and separately between the three GP units) are carried out at every processing loop. Each TMR (GIOUL and GP separately) unit votes on the state variables and processing results. If it finds any inconsistency between its results and those of the other units and three sections are active, it can recover a presumably correct state and continue processing. If one section disagrees twice in a row it is excluded. No disagreement is tolerated when only two sections are active. Besides voting on software each unit controls communications and tests internal boards functionalities. Based on hardware test results, one section can decide to exclude itself from the system. Diagnostic tests are carried out during the usual unit operation; they are implemented such that they do not modify the operating environment. Each section is also able to detect malfunctions on its databases thus deciding to exclude itself. In addition to these tasks, GIOUL has to manage the communications with the Operator Interface, and to perform tests on keyboard inputs as well. If an error is detected a signal is displayed.
TMR MODIAC is a critical system, meaning that failures or unavailability can have catastrophic consequences, both economical and for human life. The constraints to be satisfied by the system are a probability of catastrophic failure less than or equal to 1E-5 per year according to IEC 1508 (for SIL 4 systems) and no more than 5 minutes down time are allowed over 8600 hours (i.e. availability higher than or equal to 0.999990310078).
Assumptions and Modelling Approach

Assumptions and Basic Parameters
We restricted our modelling effort to the Safety Nucleus, the most relevant part of the system. Our model does not include the RDT subsystem neither the Trackside Units, but represents the overall functionalities of the Nucleus, including the main features and the interactions among the different components. The main components that must be considered in modelling the system are: hardware, software, databases and, only for GIOUL, acceptance test on the input from the Operator Terminal. Hardware aspects cover internal boards and physical characteristics of the communications while software aspects cover the operating system and software modules that are sequentially activated during the processing loops. The databases, whose control represents one of the ways for detecting errors in various modules, cover both hardware and software aspects: database malfunction can be due to either corruption of memory cells or an error of the managing software. One of the tasks that GIOUL has to perform is checking the correctness of the inputs issued by the operator terminal keyboard before transmitting them to the other modules for their processing; this check is very important since it can avoid the system to send wrong commands to the Trackside Units. For this reason the software module performing this check is not considered together with the other software modules of GIOUL. We also made the choice of not modelling in detail the system while an excluded section is restored. More precisely we account for the time required for restoring a section but we neglect the particular configurations that GIOUL and GP can assume during that period.
The definition of the basic events we have considered and the symbols used to denote their probabilities are reported in Table 1 . The following assumptions have been made:
1) "Compensation" among errors never happens;
2) The Video Switching, the Activation/de-Activation and the (external fail-safe) Exclusion Logic units are considered reliable;
3) The Diagnostic module, (that exploits majority voting), and Exclusion Management module within GIOUL and GP are considered reliable.
4) Identical erroneous outputs are produced only by correlated errors, while independent errors in the different units are always distinguishable by the voting. 5) Symmetry: the error probabilities of GIOUL and GP are the same for the three sections.
6) Errors affecting different components of the same unit (GIOUL or GP) are statistically independent.
7) The hardware communication resources of the Nucleus are considered together with the other hardware aspects; the software dealing with communications is assumed reliable.
8) During one execution, both GIOUL and GP may suffer from many errors, at most one for each component (software, hardware, databases and acceptance test for GIOUL).
9) The execution of each iteration is statistically independent from the others.
10) GIOUL units receive identical inputs from the keyboard.
Error type (Events) Symbol (GIOUL) Symbol (GP) independent error in a unit caused by an hardware fault qhl qhp an error caused by an hardware fault is not detected by the diagnostics qhdl qhdp spurious error: the diagnostic errs detecting a (non-present) error due to independent hardware fault qhndl qhndp an independent error in a database is detected qbrl qbrp an independent error in a database is not detected qbnrl qbnrp correlated error between three databases q3bdl q3bdp correlated error between two databases q2bdl q2bdp independent software error in a unit qil qip correlated software error between three units q3vl q3vp correlated software error between two units q2vl q2vp independent error of the acceptance test in a unit (it may either accept a wrong input or reject a correct one) 
Modelling Approach
The model was conceived in a modular and hierarchical fashion, structured in layers. Each layer has been structured for producing some results while hiding implementation details and internal characteristics: output values from one layer may thus be used as parameters of the next higher layer. In this way the entire modelling can be simply handled. Further, different layers can be modelled using different tools and methodologies: this leads to flexible and changeable sub-models so that one can vary the accuracy and detail with which specific aspects can be studied. The specific structure of each sub-model depends both on the system architecture and on the measurements and evaluations to be obtained. The model of the Safety Nucleus of the TMR MODIAC we have built, shown in Figure 3 , can be split into two main parts: the first part deals with one execution and computes the probabilities of success or failure; the second one, building on this, allows the evaluations of the dependability attributes for an entire mission.
In the previous section we explained that if a disagreement is found while all three sections are active, GIOUL and GP recover the correct value and participate to the next loop. This holds for one single disagreement: if one section disagrees twice in a row it is excluded at the end of the current loop. Therefore, in order to represent as close as possible the actual system behaviour, we had to make several models to keep memory of previous disagreement of one section at the beginning of the execution. • five sub-models of the behaviour of GP in configurations 3h, 3h.1, 3h.2, 3h.3, 2h (3h.x means that section x (1, 2 or 3) disagreed during the previous loop);
• five sub-models of the behaviour of GIOUL (3h, 3h. 1, 3h.2, 3h.3, 2h) .
Each of these submodels (as it will be exemplified later) accounts for all the components of GP and GIOUL respectively. Hardware, software (including correlation), databases and (for GIOUL only) acceptance test on the inputs from the operator together with their relationships are considered. Specifically hardware and software aspects cannot be always kept separated because on one side, hardware faults often manifest themselves as software errors and on the other, the methods for software fault tolerance allow to tolerate not only software faults but also hardware faults of the internal boards and of the communication hardware. This explains why GP and GIOUL models do not comprise different separated sub-models each one regarding one single aspect, but are structured as a unique global sub-model in which both interactions and specific aspects are included.
One system execution (level 2) lasts 1 second, it includes one GIOUL (1 second) and four GP (250 msec) iterations and could also be considered as brief one-second mission. Due to the need to keep memory of previous disagreements, 17 different models for one-execution have been defined: one models the system when only two sections are active, while the remaining describe the system with three active sections:
• 3h/3h: GIOUL and GP are correctly working at the beginning of the execution.
• 3h.x/3h: the GIOUL of section x (1, 2 or 3) disagreed during the previous loop while GP is correctly working.
• 3h/3h.y: GIOUL units are correctly working while the GP of section y (1, 2 or 3) disagreed during the previous (GP) execution.
• 3h.x/3h.y: both the GIOUL of section x and the GP of section y disagreed during the previous loop (x and y can represent the same section or different ones)
• 2h/2h : execution begins with only two active sections.
Each of the 17 models uses, in different combinations and sequences, the same base objects of level 1 and describes the essential characteristics of the Safety Nucleus. It models the functions of the units as a whole considering their interactions and their peculiar nature. These models are conceived to compute (and to provide to level three) the following probabilities:
• probability of success of one-execution; it is the probability that the system performs an entire one second mission correctly. This implies that the system is ready to start the next execution. It is composed by many different success probabilities according to the configuration achieved.
• probability of safe failure of one-execution; it is the probability that the system fails during one execution and stops avoiding catastrophic damages (this is ensured by the ACC system that is designed so that it stops when malfunctions occur, forcing devices and subsystems to lock in a safe state).
• probability of catastrophic failure of one-execution; it is the probability that the Nucleus, failing, keeps on sending erroneous commands causing serious damages.
The mission model (level 3), considering all the possible system configurations during one execution, describes the system behaviour during time. In particular, this model contains as many states as models defined at level 2 plus the catastrophic and benign failure states. Actually models of level two are used to provide the outgoing probabilities of the corresponding state of the model of level 3. Once that both the single execution and the mission models have been constructed we focused on which kind of measurements are required. For our highly critical system the following dependability attributes have been evaluated: reliability, safety and availability. While reliability and safety can be both obtained by computing the probabilities of catastrophic and safe failure at time t defined as the duration of the mission, availability required the definition of a specific availability model.
Models for one Execution
Two methodologies have been adopted built the models for one-execution: Discrete time Markov chains that have been manually drawn and the probability evaluation has been accomplished using "Mathematica" 1 , and Stochastic Activity Networks that have been directly solved using the software tool "Ultrasan" 2 . Since Markov chains are often impractical, even if they provide symbolic results, Ultrasan has been adopted in order to avoid building 17 repetitive one-execution models using only Markov chains. Only two models (3h/3h and 2h/2h) have been completely built using Markov chains in order to test and validate the results obtained by Ultrasan. This redundancy in building models has been very useful: some errors occurred during the model developing phase have been detected. Ultrasan has been a good choice, since we could develop one single model that allowed to compute the results for the 17 different scenarios. In fact, by assigning different values to the variables of the model, thus representing different initial markings, we could represent the different states of the system and account for previous failures of the various subcomponents. The model is also able to distinguish the various configurations without having to replicate the unchanged aspects. Only two of the seventeen models were tested using Markov chains but those two models are the most relevant ones and cover all the scenarios that need to be represented. The results obtained by Ultrasan and Markov, using the same values for the parameters, were in agreement. Now we show, as an example, some objects belonging to the two lower levels. First the Markov chains are described and later the Ultrasan model.
As an example of a model of the level 1 (base object level), we report on the left side of Fig. 4 the model of GIOUL TMR in configuration 3h (i.e. that was properly working). All the transition probabilities, not reported here to keep the Figure clear [16] , are obtained as combinations of the basic events probabilities reported in Table  1 . This Markov chain is organised into five levels plus the final states. Level one involves the hardware aspects, the level two the diagnostic tests carried out on boards and communications channels (hardware). Level three checks databases; level four investigates the behaviour of the acceptance test on the keyboard input whereas level five involves software. It should be noted that the model doesn't represent the timing relations among the various events. The models for other configurations can be obtained by analogy with this. The level upper to this (level 2 of Figure 3 ) is not concerned with this detailed view, from its perspective it is just necessary to observe that, performing one execution from configuration 3h, the GIOUL TMR can reach all the other GIOUL TMR configurations (success state) or a failure (safe or catastrophic) state. Thus this view can be represented by the Markov chain on the right side of Fig.  4 containing only the initial and the final states of the model on the left and where the transition probabilities are derived by solving the model on the left side of Fig. 4 . Once all the models of level 1 have been obtained and the related transition probabilities computed, these objects are composed into the several models for one system execution. Also for this level, only the description of one of the 17 configurations is provided; the remaining 16 can easily be obtained by analogy. This time we proceed in a top-down approach to show our models by showing first what is the viewpoint of the next level, the mission level. Of course, in order to obtain the transition probabilities mentioned above it is necessary to explode the arcs which go from the "3h/3h" state to the final states and describe the system behaviour when one iteration starts with the GIOUL and GP TMR working perfectly.
The first step of this explosion is shown partially in the lowest part of Fig. 5 (between the dashed lines); it should be noted that the graph is not complete in order to leave the figure clear, still it is easy to deduce the entire model. This model contains two levels, the first representing the outcomes of 4 executions of the GP and the second (not complete) representing the execution of GIOUL. In particular, the subtree shown at the second level is the GIOUL model previously shown in the right part of Figure 4 . The system model obtained with Ultrasan allows to represent all the 17 configurations of one execution. Also in modelling using Ultrasan we started following a modular approach, building first the basic objects (level 1) and then putting them together in the system model for one execution. Unfortunately, the valuable possibility offered by Ultrasan to define separated models and to join them into the Ultrasan "Composed Model" is very useful for conceiving a design but slows down the execution of the compound model. In fact the common places between sub-models must be attached to timed transitions, which is wasteful for this model. This causes the increment of the state number in the "Reduced Model" and decreases the evaluation speed. Thus we decided not to take advantage of this opportunity but preferred to speed up the evaluations as much as possible. Figure 6 shows the model that we actually used which was evaluated using the transient solver of Ultrasan. Despite it can just provide an idea of the size and complexity, the existence of two sub-models is visible: the upper part represents one iteration of GP and it is executed four times, the lower part represents one iteration of GIOUL executed once. An additional general problem to describing and understanding the behaviour of models built using Ultrasan derives from the extensive use of C code that is hidden into the gates.
Models for the Mission and Wanted Measures
Also the model for a mission has been developed using both Markov chains and SANs. Despite the constant time of one second required for each system execution, modelling a mission using discrete time Markov chains (MC/TD) is not feasible due the following reasons:
1) After the failure of one section, the system can operate with only two active sections (2h/2h), if no failures occur, until the failed section is restored. This usually takes a time interval in the range 5÷45 minutes (15 minutes average) i.e. a much longer time and a very large number n of states "2h/2h";
2) Since the model has to be as general as possible, the time to restore a section should be left as a parameter and this cannot be accomplished using a discrete time model. For all these reasons continuos time Markov Chains (MC/TC) have been used. The obtained model solves the above problems, but it is approximate. In fact not only it uses exponential distributions in place of the deterministic ones (this is not a problem since we use a very long mission time with respect to the time required from one execution), but the main approximation comes from the fact that the n states "2h/2h" in the hypothetical MC/TD are compressed in only one state "2h/2h". The output rates of this compressed "2h/2h" state approximate the behaviour (averaging both time and probabilities) [16] . The MC/TC model defined is partially depicted in Figure  7 only to give an idea on the state transitions. This model allows to evaluate the probabilities of safe or catastrophic failure of missions of a given duration. The model has been solved obtaining the system of differential equations [21] . The solution was obtained using Mathematica: it provided both symbolic and numerical results. The solutions we have found are complete since they allow to evaluate the probability of safe or catastrophic failure over any given time interval t. To validate this approximated model we compared the results obtained with those returned by a mission model built using Ultrasan (where time distribution is still exponential). The Ultrasan model is structured into two layers: the lower layer is composed by a number of sub-models each one representing a given system configuration, and an higher level ("Composed Model") that joins the sub-models as required. For the model of a mission we did use the Composed Model without slowing down the execution speed because each sub-model already contained timed transitions at the beginning. In Figure 8a the sub-model representing the configuration "3h/3h" is shown: the other sub-models are very similar. In Figure 8b the "Composed Model" is shown; each box indicates one sub-model of one-execution and the "join" box links them together. Again this drawings are meant just to show the size of the models, to really describe them in details a considerable amount of c code should be shown.
The two mission models (with the Markov chains and with SANs) have been tested against each other on the same input data for variable mission duration up to one year. The results provided are of the same magnitude as soon as t reaches 1000 seconds, and for t from one day up they can be considered identical; as t grows, the number of identical significant digits increases and even exceeds the desired accuracy. While we preferred to use the Ultrasan model to obtain the results for one execution (and used a Markov one to validate it) because of the possibility to represent all the different configurations within a single model, here we have done the opposite: we used the model based on Markov to compute the results and the one based on SANs to validate it. We preferred to use Mathematica and the Markov model to achieve results at a higher speed: only few minutes are required to provide the results for one year missions while our Ultrasan model requires several days.
Once the probabilities of success or failure (safe and catastrophic) in one year have been obtained, it is immediate to find out the reliability and safety measures while to obtain availability measures it is necessary build an availability model which is represented by the continuos Markov Chain (MC/TC) illustrated in Figure 9 . When the system is in state F, it is operating and provides a correct service. R and C indicate the repair states: the system is not available following a safe failure (R) or a catastrophic failure (C). The system resuming rates are "m", following a safe failure, and "mm", following a catastrophic failure. "l" indicates the failure transition rate; it should be multiplied for "f", the probability of safe failure, or for "fc", the probability of catastrophic failure. This model may look strange, but it must considered that the system has to manage an entire railway station with several tracks. It must resume working also after a 'catastrophic' failure to manage those parts of the controlled system which have not been affected by the failure. 
Evaluations
Once the models have been realised, the system behaviour can be evaluated, to check for example if the system meets its requirements, and to analyse the sensitivity to the various parameters. There are many input variables for the set of models which can be split in those necessary to the models representing one execution and those for models of the mission. The models of one execution require the probability values of the basic events (described in Table 1 ) while those related to the mission require i) the results of the evaluation of one execution, ii) the repair time for restoring an excluded section, iii) the mission time, and iv) the recovery time (only for the availability model). To show some examples we assigned "a priori" reasonable values (which are not meant to represent the real situation for the system) to all the parameters and investigated the sensitivity of the dependability measures to just one parameter at a time. Here, due to space limitations, we do not report all our evaluations: i) sensitivity to the main parameters (hardware, software), ii) to the secondary parameters, iii) a specific study on software correlation, and iv) location of dependability bottlenecks [16] . The probability values of the basic events (on a period of one hour of observation) are reported in Table 2 , while we set the mission duration to one year, the failure rate l (which has to be multiplied by the failure probability) to one per hour, the repair rate following a safe failure, m, to 2 per hour and the repair rate following a catastrophic failure, mm, to 1/2 per hour. In order to reduce the number of parameters in our plots we assumed the probability of software independent faults to be the same for GIOUL and GP: qil = qip = qiv, for the independent errors caused by hardware faults we used qhw, with qhl = .8 qhw and qhp = .2 qhw. Furthermore we decided to link the probability of correlated error between two units (q2c) to that of independent software error (qiv): q2c = corr qiv 2 , and to set "corr" to 100: this corresponds to the assumption of a positive correlation among software errors. The alternative would have been to assign values directly to q2c.
Measurements with Variable Software Error Probability
Figures 10, 11(a) and 11(b) show the probability of failure, the probability of catastrophic failure and the availability, respectively, on missions of one year, as a function of qiv the probability of software independent error. The range goes from 1E-3 to 1E-6 per hour; curves for different values of the hardware caused error probability per unit are reported. Observing the shapes of the curves in Figure 10 , it is clear that reliability is sensitive to variations of the software error probability if hardware quality is good enough (i.e., 1E-5 to 1E-6), instead it becomes more and more insensitive as the hardware error probability increases. The curves also point out that decreasing the probability of software error over 1E-5 (that is improving the quality of the software) is practically useless without improving the figures related to the other system components as well. In fact, while in the left side of the Figure, from 1E-3 to 1E-5, it can be observed that the reliability improves, it remains approximately constant for the values in the right side. This suggests also the methodology to be used for finding dependability bottlenecks, since in this way it is possible to understand which are the parameters to be improved in order to bring most benefit to the system.
Probability of failure
The shape of the curves representing the probability of catastrophic failure, shown in Figure 11 (a), appears quite different. Safety is almost a "linear" function of the probability of independent software error: the more the software error probability decreases and the more the safety improves. The same Figure also points out that the safety seems completely insensitive to variations of the hardware error probability: in fact, it is difficult to distinguish among the four curves shown. It should also be noted that the system satisfies its target (that for such systems is usually 1E-5 per year, according to IEC 1508) if independent error probability values are less than or equal to 1E-4. Figure 11(b) shows the availability, it clearly points out that the availability is very high and almost constant when the software error probability ranges form 1E-4 to 1E-6, while it is a bit worse for higher values. The Figure shows also that there are almost no variations of the availability for values of the hardware error probability equal or better than 1E-4. In any case the system is never affected by availability lacks, since the target (5 minutes unavailability over 8600 hours, i.e. 0.9999903) is satisfied in all the considered range of the software error probability. In short, within our parameters setting, the software must be regarded as a critical factor for safety, while it appears of almost no concern for availability.
Conclusions
The present work represents an example that shows how real system models can be built and then studied in order to evaluate their dependability. Of course, conceiving such models is not simple at all, since they usually have to represent complex architectures and account for many different characteristics. Our experience is that this task is made possible when carried out adopting suitable principles. The specifications and all the documentation had to be studied in depth in order to acquire the really important aspects for dependability; later some feasible simplifying hypotheses have been introduced, trying to estimate under which conditions these could be considered valid. Complexity must be reduced as much as possible; our approach has been to build a hierarchical model structured in layers; these layers have been designed keeping in mind the system behaviour and the wanted measures.
Layers can consist of several sub-layers in order to isolate, whenever possible, those components or aspects that must appear to the upper layer as unique objects with their associated probabilities. This further decomposition allows a better analysis of particular system characteristics and reduces the complexity even further. Different modelling approaches and tools can be adopted for the different layers: this gives the flexibility to identify and use the most suitable modelling method and evaluation tool for each level. Last, and very important, in order to validate the most complex models, we built alternatives using different tools and methodologies; this constitutes an example of application of diversity and proved to be very useful since it allowed to find small bugs and imperfections and to gain more confidence that the models represented the real system behaviour.
With respect to the evaluated characteristics of the Ansaldo TMR MODIAC, our analyses, which have not been reported here, allowed to establish the dependability bottlenecks of the current system and to state targets for the several subcomponents such that the system targets could be reached. We could thus provide hints for next releases or modifications of the systems and information to assign targets, and consequently the budget, to the various components of the system. The work presented in this paper constitutes a nucleus that will be expanded in further studies: some directions are, the release of some of the simplifying hypotheses or the modelling of some variation of the system characteristics to better identify directions for next releases. Another step to be also carried on is the modelling of the rest of the system, to evaluate the dependability figures accounting for the Trackside units and the communication network.
